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Abstract. This paper presents a model of bank-loan repayment as a signaling game with a set
of discrete types of borrowers. The type of borrower is the return on an investment project.
A possibility of renegotiation of the loan agreement leads to an equilibrium in which the
borrower adjusts the repaid amount to the liquidation value of its assets (from the bank’s
point of view). In the equilibrium, there are numerous pooling equilibrium points, with values
rising according to the expected liquidation value of the loan. The article additionally proposes
a mechanism forcing the borrower to pay all of his return instead of the common liquidation
value of subset of types of the borrower. The paper contains also a simple numerical example
explaining this mechanism.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A bank, granting a loan, has no possibility of influencing its actual spending; hence,
a precise credit agreement should be signed. The main elements of a loan agreement are:
the amount of the loan, the amount of repayment and collateral. Due to the asymmetry
of information, a necessary component of the loan agreement is collateral, imposing
on the debtor an incentive to repay the loan. However, the option to renegotiate the
loan agreement, changes the relationship between the bank and the borrower.
The possibility of renegotiation inclines the borrower to transfer a part of the risk
to the lender. The research belonging to the theory of incomplete contracts suggest
that the borrower renegotiate a contract or even does not make repayment if the
liquidation value of collateral is low. This idea is incorporated, among others, in the
works of: Aghion and Bolton (1992), Bester (1994), Hart and Moor (1994 and 1998),
Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), Lacker (2001) and Paliński (2013).
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According to this research, the liquidation value of collateral determines not only
the amounts recovered by the bank in the absence of repayment of the loan, but also
affects the results of renegotiation of the debt. This is due to the fact that the threat
of liquidation of assets motivates the borrower to avoid insolvency; consequently, the
liquidation value determines the amount of debt repayment. When the liquidation
value is low – the bargaining power of the borrower increases and the amount of debt
repayment reduces.
The main aim of this article is to analyze a model of loan repayment as a signaling
game in which the borrower sends a signal – a proposed amount of repayment –
whereas the bank receives the signal and takes action – accepts or rejects the proposal
(Cho and Kreps, 1987; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). Depending on the liquidation
value of the borrower’s assets, the possibility of the debt renegotiation plays a crucial
role in the model. The presented model refers to the issue of the role of collateral
for the repayment of the loan and the renegotiation considered by Bester (1994). In
addition, a voluntary repayment of the loan is assumed in the model, in which the
borrower determines the amount of repayment, trying to avoid enforcement of the debt.
This approach refers to models of Krasa–Villamil (2000) and Krasa–Sharma–Villamil
(2005).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
assumptions of the model and the analysis of the equilibrium in the model. Section 3
contains a proposition of an incentive mechanism, motivating the borrower to repay
the highest possible amount. Section 4 provides main conclusions.
2. THE MODEL
Consider an economy with two risk neutral agents: an entrepreneur and a bank (their
indexes are, respectively, E and B). Assume that the entrepreneur signed a credit
agreement with the bank to finance a venture. The credit agreement (I, R1, C) with
the bank is a triplet that with a given amount of the loan I determines the amount of
repayment R1 and collateral C. Loan repayment R1 is independent of realization of
the project; thus, we assume that the credit agreement as a standard debt contract
(SDC) with collateral. The standard debt contract is a contract in which a borrower
agrees to pay a fixed amount, and non-payment allows a bank to seize the borrower’s
assets being the output of the project.
The return of the project is a random variable Y with discrete realizations
y ∈ W = {0, . . . ,y} ⊂ R+, where y > 0, with cumulative distribution F (y). This
return of the project is observable without costs only to the entrepreneur, what is
known to both agents before signing the agreement. Agents have common knowledge
of the prior beliefs β(·) on the set of possible realizations of Y, where β(y) > 0.
In case of default, the entrepreneur can turn to the bank for debt restructuring
involving a cancellation of the debt. The bank may restructure the debt or seize
collateral together with the venture.
The value of collateral is lower for the bank than for the borrower because of
the cost of acquisition and liquidation, and is bC, where 0 ≤ b < 1. Similarly, the
acquisition and management of the project generates considerable costs, thus the value
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of the project for the bank is aY, where 0 ≤ a < 1. Assume further that bC ≤ R1,
which means that the bank does not have collateral exceeding the value of the loan.
Assume also a reservation utility of the bank u, which can be positive for an insolvent
borrower or negative for a promising borrower. Let us define the value of the borrower’s
asset from the bank’s point of view in the case of default as follows.
Definition 2.1. The value L (y) = ay + bC + u is called the liquidation value of loan.
After signing the credit agreement (I, R1, C ) in period t = 0, the game of loan
repayment is as follows.
1) In the first period t = 1, nature selects the return of the project y.
2) In the next period t = 2, the entrepreneur observes the realization of the project.
Knowing the return of the project the entrepreneur decides to make voluntary
payment v ∈ V = [0, y] ⊂ R+. If v < R1, then the entrepreneur declares default
and counts on debt forgiveness. The pure strategy of the entrepreneur is the
payment v made after observing the return of the project y. The decision on
the payment v can no longer be changed at a later date (due to the inclusion of
relevant data in financial books).
3) In the last period t = 3, the bank observes proposed v, but does not know the true
state of nature. When v < R1, the bank decides whether to restructure the debt
and sign a new credit agreement (I, v, C ) or to seize the project with collateral.
If proposed v = R1, the bank accepts payment in accordance with the credit
agreement. The behavior strategy of the lender σB ∈
∑
B = [0, 1] is the probability
of loan restructuring and acceptance of payment υ. The strategy σB = 1 means
the acceptance of the payment υ; moreover, if υ < R1 – this means a new contract
and partial cancellation of the debt on amount x = R1 − υ. While σB = 0 means
the liquidation of the loan.
Expected payoff of the entrepreneur EpiE and the bank EpiB for the pair of
strategies υ and σB after observing the return y by the entrepreneur are as follows:
Eυ,σBpiE(y, υ,σB) = σB(y − υ)− (1− σB)C (1)
and:
EσBpiB(y, ν,σB) =
∑
y∈W
β(y|υ)[σBυ + (1− σB)(ay + bC)] (2)
An updated belief β (y|υ) is the probability assigned by the bank to the type of
the entrepreneur y after observing the proposed payment υ.
Definition 2.2. A strategy profile v,σB along with beliefs β (y), β (y|v) is a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium if and only if:
(i) v ∈ V maximizes Eυ,σBpiE(y, υ,σB) for every y.
(ii) σB ∈
∑
B maximizes EσBpiB(y, υ,σB) for every υ.
(iii) β (y|v) = υ(y)β(y)∑
y
′∈Y [υ(y
′)β(y′)]
if it is possible. Otherwise β (y|υ) is any probability
on {y ∈W |y ≥ υ}.
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Conditions (i) and (ii) impose a requirement that each strategy was perfect
Bayesian equilibrium for each subgame with some beliefs. The return on the project y is,
at the same time, the type of entrepreneur in the game. Condition (iii) specifies how
to update beliefs after observing the amount of repayment v using Bayes’s rule (Bayes,
Price, 1763; see: Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).
The entrepreneur, knowing the return on the project y and deciding to make
a payment υ, has to solve the following problem.
Problem 2.1. At time t = 2 find υ and σB to solve the following optimization problem
max
υ,σB
Eυ,σBpiE (y, υ,σB) (3)
subject to:
EσBpiB (y, υ,σB) ≥
∑
y∈W
β(y|υ)min {R1, L (y)} for each y,
having β (y|υ) > 0 (4)
0 ≤ υ ≤ y and υ ≤ R1 for all y (5)
υ,σB ,β (y) ,β (y|υ) are a perfect Bayesian equilibrium at t = 3 (6)
The individual rationality constraint of the bank (4) indicates that in case of
payment lower than the payment R1 required by the credit agreement the bank in the
worst case is assured of the expected liquidation value of the loan.
Condition (5) imposes a requirement on the voluntary payment υ that it be no
greater than the return on the project y and does not exceed R1.
Definition 2.3. Let yk ∈W is an arbitrary chosen type of the borrower. The expected
liquidation value of the loan, ELk, for types y ∈W, y ≥ yk, is defined as follows:
ELk = max
y∈W
∑
y≥yk
β (y) (ay + bC + u)∑
y≥yk
β (y)
≤ yk (7)
where y1 = min
y≥ bC+u
(1−a)
y, yk+1 = min
y>yk
y such that ELk > yk, k = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n.
The expected liquidation value ELk is defined as the maximum expected value
of liquidation of some subset of types greater or equal than yk, for which this value
is not greater than the return on the project of the lowest type yk in the subset.
The yk belongs to a discrete set of types, whereas the expected liquidation value ELk is
a real number; therefore, there is a weak inequality in formula (7). The next expected
liquidation value ELk+1 can be calculated for a subset of types greater than the largest
type in the previous subset.
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Proposition 2.1. The solution of Problem 2.1 is the following perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which
1) The strategy of the borrower is:
v (y) =

0, y <
bC + u
(1− a) ,
ELk,
bC + u
(1− a) ≤ y <
R1 − bC − u
a
,
R1, y ≥ R1 − bC − u
a
.
k = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n,
2) The strategy of the bank is:
σB (υ) =

0, υ <
bC + u
(1− a)
1, υ ≥ bC + u
(1− a)
Proof. Consider a borrower whose return is less than his liquidation value of the loan
L(y), that is y < ay + bC + u = L(y). Such borrower is able to pay υ ≤ y < L(y).
An updated belief of the borrower’s type is β (y < (bC + u)/(1− a)|υ) = 1, so the
strategy of the bank is liquidation σB = 0 and the strategy of the borrower is not to
pay, which satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 2.2.
Consider a borrower y1 ∈ W , whose return is equal to or greater than
his liquidation value, such that y1 = min bC +u
1−a ≤ y≤ y y. He is able to pay υ ≥
(bC + u)/(1 − a) to avoid liquidation. Consider further types of borrower y ∈{
y1, . . . , y1
} ⊂ [ bC +u1− a , y], where y1 ≥ y1, for which the expected liquidation value is
1∑
y∈{yk,...,yk} β(y)
[∑
y∈{y1,...,y1} β (y) ay + bC + u
]
= EL1 ≤ y1. Rather than pay an
amount equal to their return on investment y (which will give them an income equal
zero), they can pretend a lower return and pay υ = EL1, which gives them y – EL1 ≥ 0.
On the basis of the proposed repayment v, the bank is not able to distinguish the type
of borrower and an updated belief is β (y ≥ (bC + u)/(1− a)|υ = EL1) = 1. As the
expected liquidation value is EL1 = υ, the bank will accept this payment, and will
use a strategy σB (υ) = 1. Liquidation would give the bank no more.
None of the types of borrower can individually change the strategy to repay less
than the liquidation value of the common EL1, even if its own liquidation value is
below the common value EL1, because in the absence of correlation with other types,
this would reduce the value of the repayment below the expected liquidation value.
In case EL1 > υ, the bank would prefer liquidation and repayment v less than the
liquidation value EL1 by the borrower of any type would result in the change of bank’s
strategy to σB (v) = 0, which would give the borrower income –C. Hence, repayment
υ < EL1 is not the optimal strategy of the borrower.
84 A. Paliński
Consequently, both strategies satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 2.2. There
exist conditions for pooling equilibrium in which borrower of types y ∈ {y1, . . . , y1}
pay the same amount v = EL1.
If, however, the expected liquidation value of the loan EL1 for all types of
y ≥ (bC + u)/(1 − a) was greater than y1, then for types y > y1 must be created
another equilibrium υ = EL2 > y1 ≥ EL1 providing loan restructuring. Otherwise,
the bank would prefer to liquidate, giving him a higher expected payoff, rather than
restructuring the debt.
This reasoning should be repeated for the next ELk until the expected liquidation
value of the loan for a certain type y exceeds repayment R1 required in the loan
agreement. Substituting y with R1 in the formula of the liquidation value we get
y ≥ (R1 − bC − u)/a. Above this value, the borrower repays the amount υ = R1, and
the bank has to accept payment according to the loan agreement.
Figure 1 depicts a diagram of debt repayment depending on the amount of return
on the project resulting from Proposition 2.1. Repayment of the loan R1, specified in
the loan contract, begins not when return is y = R1, but when the expected liquidation
value of the loan is equal to R1, that is for y satisfying the inequality ay+bC+u ≥ R1.
 
v(y)
y
R1
y = (R1-bC-u)/a
Fig. 1. Loan repayment diagram resulting from Proposition 2.1
3. EXTENSION OF THE MODEL – FUTURE LOANS
There exists a great amount of literature the on so-called relationship lending. Such
a term covers the economic value of long-term cooperation between a bank and
a borrower – an important role in this field plays the model of Rajan (1992) (see
Boot, 2000 for overview of the models; examples of empirical studies can be found in
works of: Petersen and Rajan, 1994, Degryse, 2000, Bharath et al., 2007). Omitting
complex interdependencies of such relationship, each entrepreneur thinking about
further operating activity, needs future loans.
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Let us assume that the enterprise – current borrower – has ability to run next
project that can give him the expected payoff Epi2. The enterprise requires external
sources of financing to run this project. Taking into account the finding of Proposi-
tion 2.1. we would like to construct a mechanism that would force the borrower to pay
all his return on the first project instead of the expected liquidation value. If we made
the probability of granting the next loan by the incumbent bank dependent on the
amount repaid for the first loan we would achieve the mechanism of true payment.
Assumption 3.1. Let m be the probability of granting the next loan. Correct mech-
anism m (υ) depending on the amount of the repayment of the previous loan must
meet the following conditions:
1) Repayment v ≤ (bC + u)/(1− a) means taking over collateral and usually results
in bankruptcy of the borrower – not giving a chance to grant another loan, i.e.
m (υ ≤ (bC + u)/(1− a)) = 0.
2) Repayment required in the loan agreement and equal to R1 is reworded in certainty
of getting another loan, i.e. m (υ = R1) = 1.
3) Repayment between these extreme values υ ∈
(
bC +u
1− a , R1
)
allows for another
loan with the probability that is a linear function of the repaid amount on the
interval specified by extreme values. This is due to the fact that a standard debt
contract for y < R1 is a linear function of the return on the business venture and
is R(y) = y (cf. Gale and Helwig, 1985).
Condition 3) should ensure that υ (y) = y.
Lemma 3.1. The mechanism satisfying Assumption 3.1. is described by the following
function:
m (υ) =

0, υ <
bC + u
(1− a)
υ − bC +u1− a
R1 − bC +u1− a
, υ ≥ bC + u
(1− a)
Proof.
(1) m
(
υ = bC +u1− a
)
= 0.
(2) m (υ = R1) = 1.
(3) The function m (υ) is linear for υ ∈
[
bC + u
1− a ,R1
]
.
The effectiveness of such a mechanism to incentivize the borrower to allocate the
total return on the project y for repayment of the loan will depend on the value of
the expected return on the next investment project Epi2. The expected value of a new
project from the point of view of the entrepreneur is also dependent on the probability
of granting the next loan, without which it will be impossible to undertake the project
due to a lack of funds.
Proposition 3.1. Mechanism m (υ) is effective when:
Epi2 ≥ 1
1− a [R1 − L (R1)] .
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Proof. According to Proposition 2.1., some types of borrower try to form pooling
equilibrium υ, for which their total expected liquidation value is no less than their
possible payment υ. The payment υ is lower than or equal to return y for each type
forming the pooling equilibrium.
To avoid forming an equilibrium, it is necessary for each type of borrower that the
expected value of payoff from the next investment project after repayment of the whole
return of the current project y is not less than the excess return y over the payment υ.
For this purpose two conditions must be fulfilled:
1) m (y)Epi2 ≥ y − L (y), for each bC +u1− a ≤ y ≤ R1.
2) [m (y′′)−m (y′)]Epi2 ≥ y′′ − y′, for each y′′ > y′ , where y′′ , y′ ∈ W , bC +u1− a ≤
y′ ≤ R1, bC +u1− a ≤ y′′ ≤ R1.
The first condition is that the lowest possible payment v equal to the expected
liquidation value for any type is not profitable. The second condition implies that
if EL(y
′′
) ≥ y′ , the strategy of pretending lower return and payment υ = y′ is also
unprofitable.
Starting from Condition (1) and substitutingm (υ) with function from Lemma 3.1.,
we have:
m (y)Epi2 =
y − bC +u1− a
R1 − bC +u1− a
Epi2 ≥ y − L (y) = y − ay + bC + u
which, after transformation, gives:
Epi2 ≥ (1− a)R1 − bC − u = R1 − L (R1)
Considering Condition (2) we have:
[m (y′′)−m (y′)]Epi2 =
[
y′′ − bC +u1− a
R1 − bC +u1− a
− y
′ − bC +u1− a
R1 − bC +u1− a
]
Epi2 ≥ y′′ − y′
Rearranging we get:(
y
′′ − y′
)
Epi2 ≥ (y′′ − y′)
(
R1 − bC + u
1− a
)
which leads to:
Epi2 ≥ R1 − bC + u
1− a =
1
1− a [(1− a)R1 − bC − u]
and finally gives:
Epi2 ≥ 1
1− a [R1 − L (R1)]
Since 1/(1− a) ≥ 1, Condition (2) imposes a higher or equal value on Epi2 than
Condition (1); therefore, Condition (2) is binding.
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Mechanism m (v) appears to be effective when the expected payoff from a future
project is not less than the difference between the repayment under a loan agreement R1
and the repayment of the liquidation value for y equal to repayment R1 multiplied by
the reciprocal of the coefficient of the loss of value of the project. In the case of the
standard debt contract return on the project y = R1 is the border point, below which
there is an area of insolvency.
The result of Proposition 3.1. is not very optimistic. The expected value of a new
project planned by the borrower must be high so that the borrower would spend the
whole return from the first project to repay the loan. This is illustrated by a simple
numerical example. Let us take the following assumptions: R1 = 100, C = 100, u = 0.
The minimum Epi2, value depending on the recovery coefficients a and b, is shown in
Table 1.
Table 1. The minimum expected payoff of the next project Epi2 incentivizing the borrower to
repay the first loan depending on recovery coefficients a and b
Coefficient a
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
b
0.1 88.89 87.50 85.71 83.33 80.00 75.00 66.67 50.00 –
0.2 77.78 75.00 71.43 66.67 60.00 50.00 33.33 – –
0.3 66.67 62.50 57.14 50.00 40.00 25.00 – – –
0.4 55.56 50.00 42.86 33.33 20.00 – – – –
0.5 44.44 37.50 28.57 16.67 – – – – –
0.6 33.33 25.00 14.29 – – – – – –
0.7 22.22 12.50 – – – – – – –
0.8 11.11 – – – – – – – –
0.9 – – – – – – – – –
Under normal economic conditions, most common recovery rates are of 0.2–0.5,
the profitability of assets is equal from several to more than ten percent, and the share
of debt in financing a project is about half of the investment funds. In this situation,
the next business project would have to be several times larger than the previous
project to ensure the required expected payoff, which is hardly possible in practice.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The key role for the repayment of the bank loan plays the liquidation value of assets
of the borrower. In the game of loan repayment, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is
formed from a plurality of pooling equilibria in which the amount of the repayment
of the loan is equal to the common expected liquidation value of several types. Each
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following point of pooling equilibrium is created by a subset of types of the borrower
with a higher common expected liquidation value.
We can construct a mechanism motivating the borrower to use the total return on
the investment project to repay the loan, if the repayment is not in accordance with
the loan agreement. This mechanism is based on the dependence of the probability
of granting a future loan on the repayment of the former loan. Unfortunately, the
effectiveness of this mechanism is limited by the high expected value of the future
investment project.
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